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Horowitz: Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
COMMITTEE FOR GI RIGHTS v. CALLAWAY
LAW-Criminal Procedure-FourthAmendment-Servicemen have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
an Army barracks. 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The problem of drug abuse in the military has recently been
brought to public attention by the fact that an alarmingly large
number of American soldiers became addicted to narcotics while
serving in Vietnam.' In Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway,2
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that mass searches of enlisted men pursuant to a
drug abuse prevention program 3 adopted by the United States
CONSTITUTIONAL

1. An estimate made by the provost marshall's office in Saigon in 1971 indicated that
"between 10 and 15 per cent of the American troops in Vietnam are on hard drugs...
about 30,000 to 40,000 addicts in uniform." 117 CONG. REc. S8440 (daily ed. June 8, 1971)
(remarks of Senator Hughes). Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa, discussing the threat to
civilian society of drug abuse in the armed forces, stated:
In America, where the cost of illegal heroin and other narcotics is high, the
only way that most addicts can support their habit is by crime. In other words,
as we release increasing thousands of addicted servicemen back into our society,
we are inviting a horrifying addition to what is already the major source of crime
in our cities.
Id.
2. 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'g 370 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C. 1974).
3. In recognition that "drug abuse is a profoundly serious national problem that is
having a grave effect on the Armed Forces," (H.R. Rp. No. 433, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28
(1971)), Congress included in its amendments to the Selective Service Act of 1967 (50
U.S.C. §§ 451 et. seq. (1971)), a provision directing the Secretary of Defense to "prescribe
and implement procedures, utilizing all practical available methods, and provide necessary facilities to (1) identify, treat, and rehabilitate members of the Armed Forces who
are drug or alcohol dependent persons .
Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129,
§ 501(a), 85 Stat. 361.
In response to this directive, the Army's European Command began to implement a
drug abuse prevention campaign in late 1972. Initially, the details of the program were
left to local commanders. See Brief for Appellees at 3, Committee For GI Rights v.
Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975) [hereinafter referred to as Brief for Appellees].
As a result of numerous departures from constitutionally permissible practices, including
strip searches of whole companies of GIs (see Brief for Appellees at 5), plaintiffs-appellees,
18 enlisted men and the Committee For GI Rights, an "unofficial, unincorporated association of American Military personnel, formed . . . in order to protest the policies and
practices which give rise to this lawsuit," (Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d
466, 468 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1975)) brought this class action on behalf of approximately 145,000
soldiers between the ranks of E-1 (private) and E-5 (Specialist Fifth Class) stationed in
Europe. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief from various aspects of the program
claimed to be unconstitutional. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934,
937 (D.D.C. 1974).
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Army in Europe (USAREUR) did not violate the fourth amendment' although they were conducted without warrants and in the
absence of probable cause."
The drug abuse control program, as described in USAREUR
Circular 600-85 [hereinafter referred to as the Circular], consists
of three fairly distinct phases: identification, evaluation, and rehabilitation. Only "identified"' drug or alcohol abusers are subIn an order denying the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the district,
judge "strongly suggested to the Army that the promulgation of a USAREUR-wide directive would clarify the facts and issues in the case." Brief for Appellees at 7. In response,
the Secretary of the Army promulgated USAREUR Circular 600-85 (Sept. 10, 1973)
which described in detail the procedures to be followed under the program and which discontinued some of the practices of which the plaintiffs-appellees had complained. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934, 937 (D.D.C. 1974).
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
5. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The
court ruled on several additional matters. Noting that the plaintiffs "have been and
continue to be subjected to drug inspections which may serve to identify them for purposes
of mandatory drug processing and even criminal prosecutions," id. at 471-72, the court
concluded that they satisfied the standing requirements of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The court further determined that exhaustion of military remedies would "merely delay a decision by the federal courts [footnote
omitted]" and was, therefore, not essential. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518
F.2d 466, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see text accompanying notes 54-56 infra. It was also
concluded that the jurisdictional amount required under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1971) was
satisfied although the plaintiffs were seeking injunctive rather than monetary relief. Committee For GI Rights v, Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Gomez v.
Wilson, 477 F.2d 411, 420 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Plaintiffs also claimed that the imposition of nonmedical administrative sanctions
without a prior hearing violated their rights under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. Concluding that the "individual GI cannot be said to suffer any 'grievous
loss' which 'outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication,'" (Committee
For GI Rights v. Callaway, 418 F.2d 466, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1975), quoting Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970)), the Callaway court rejected the plaintiffs' argument and reversed the decision below. This conclusion reflects the court's complete deference to the
Army's claim of necessity. See text accompanying notes 26-64 infra.
6. The identification process recognizes four categories of drug abusers. Cir. 600-85,
para. 7a states that a person may be classified as a "suspected" drug or alcohol abuser if
there is credible information that he was under the influence of drugs or used alcohol
excessively, or if at least two of the following indices apply: (1) he was in the company of
individuals he knew to be using illegal drugs; (2) he has displayed "unexplained changes
in job performance, behavior, or physical condition related to the use of. . .drugs"; (3)
he frequents "known drug sales points" on a regular basis. Committee For GI Rights v.
Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 468 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Cir. 600-8-5, para. 8a classifies as an "identified" drug or alcohol abuser any person
whose activities furnish clear and convincing evidence of any of the following:
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ject to the program. Identification is premised on either informants' reports or the discovery of actual possession of drugs.7 The
searches 8 at issue in Callaway were designed to assist the identification process. The Circular authorizes inspection of a soldier's
belongings, his clothing, and his person including groin and
anus.9
Upon identification as a possible drug user, the soldier enters
the second phase of the program-evaluation-which is accomplished by mandatory drug processing.10 Initially, he is confronted
by his commanding officer who informs him of the basis of the
identification, advises him of his rights, and provides him with
the opportunity to present evidence that he is not a drug abuser.
The case is then referred to a Community Drug and Alcohol Assistance Center (CDAAC) which evaluates the evidence. If the
evidence is found to be adequate, the soldier is sent to a Medical
Treatment Facility (MTF) for clinical testing. Counsel is provided at this stage if requested."
Upon certification as a confirmed drug abuser, the GI enters
the rehabilitation stage of the program; he may be admitted to a
hospital or returned to the CDAAC for a 60-day rehabilitation
program. Under this program the soldier may be required to submit to periodic medical testing, counseling, and treatment. After
medical confirmation, the Commanding Officer may impose a
(1) self-admitted current abuse; (2) illegal possession of controlled substances
as defined in Army Regulation 600-50, or substances or drug paraphenalia prohibited by USAREUR Regulation 632-10; (3) illegal or improper use of drugs
other than alcohol; (4) drunk driving; (5) public drunkenness; (6) disorderly
conduct with alcohol or other drug involvement; and (7) drunk on duty.
Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, supra at 469 n.7.
Cir. 600-85, para. 10a indicates that a person may be "medically confirmed" as a drug
or alcohol abuser as a result of referral by the Community Drug and Alcohol Assistance
Center, medical examination or treatment of drug-related diseases or injuries, or by other
medical evidence (e.g., needle marks). Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, supra at
469 n.8.
7. Cir. 600-85, para. 8a, quoted in Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp.
934, 938 (D.D.C. 1974).
8. The searches are authorized by annex I, para. 3a of the Circular. Committee For
GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
9. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934, 938 (D.D.C. 1974).
10. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466,469 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Individuals identified as "medically confirmed" drug abusers are immediately placed in a rehabilitation program which eliminates the "evaluation" phase. Id. at 469 n.9.
11. Id. The court noted that, subject to a few exceptions, no disciplinary or rehabilitative measures are sanctioned prior to MTF certification. Id. at 469 n.11.
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variety of nonmedical administrative sanctions.' 2
Following the 60-day rehabilitation period, the Commanding
Officer and the CDAAC decide whether the objectives of the
program have been realized. If the program is deemed successful,
the soldier is permitted to return to normal duties subject to a
300-day follow-up program of testing and observation. If it is

determined that the goals of the rehabilitation program were not
achieved, however, the soldier is processed for an administrative

discharge which may be under less than honorable conditions.
Evidence developed during a soldier's participation in the pro-

gram is admissible at a court-martial. 3 Furthermore, the Circular
sanctions distribution of such information to other governmental

agencies' 4 and to prospective civilian employers.' 5
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court,
in a memorandum opinion dated January 14, 1974,1' and an order
entered February 8, 1974, granted the plaintiffs-appellees partial
relief by issuing a mandatory injunction requiring cancellation of

the Circular and prior related orders and instructions. 7 The court
found that the Circular authorizes inspections without warrants

and in the absence of probable cause. It held that such searches
12. Id. at 469. The court stated that the sanctions are rehabilitative rather than
punitive. Id.
13. Cir. 600-85, annex I provides that the discharge will be either an honorable or a
general discharge provided that evidence of drug abuse falls within the general exemption
policy outlined in Cir. 600-85, annex I:
[A] soldier who requests rehabilitation help, is mandatorily referred, or otherwise obtains help for a drug problem is exempt from disciplinary action under
the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] and from discharge under less
than honorable conditions for prior use or incidental possession of drugs for his
personal use occurring before he asked for or otherwise received help ....
Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 470 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Paragraph
2(c) of annex I further provides:
The exemption policy also applies to soldiers identified as drug abusers by
involuntary urinalysis and clinical evaluation by a physician. Evidence obtained
directly or indirectly as a result of urinalysis administered for the purpose of
identifying drug users, evidence attributable to the volunteering for treatment,
or any admission made by the service member after mandatory referral may not
be used, in whole or in part, to support a disciplinary action under the UCMJ
or an undesirable discharge.
Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, supra at 470 n.13. The exemption policy does not
apply to use or possession of drugs which were previously known to military officials or to
sale of drugs or other offenses which may be motivated by drug abuse. Id.
14. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
15. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934, 938 (D.D.C. 1974).
16. The opinion of the district court is reported at 370 F. Supp. 934, (D.D.C. 1974).
17. Id. at 941.
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are not justified by military necessity'" and that the use of information obtained in the course of such inspections for the purpose
of imposing punitive sanctions'9 violates the plaintiffs' fourth
amendment rights. 0
In reversing the decision below, the court of appeals noted
that cases2' decided subsequent to entry of the district court's
judgment established the principle that distinctions between the
military and civilian environments warrant the application of
different constitutional standards.2 2 The court stated:2
18. Id. at 940. For a complete discussion of the issue of military necessity see Imwinkelried & Zillman, ConstitutionalRights and Military Necessity: Reflections on the
Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 396, 419-21 (1976). Judge Gerhard Gesell, in rejecting
the Army's claim of military necessity, observed:
[The Army] urges that the USAREUR drug abuse program is required to
prevent serious impairment of morale and discipline and that, accordingly,
under the well-established doctrine . . . [that] the constitutional rights of
soldiers affected by the program must be judicially determined to be inapplicable under these circumstances. The Army has the burden of establishing military necessity, however, and it has failed to do so.
• . . One does not automatically forfeit the protections of the Constitution
when he enters military service. The constitutional rights of a GJ., including
his privacy, may not be infringed except to the extent that the military can
demonstrate by concrete proof an urgent necessity to act unconstitutionally in
order to preserve a significant aspect of discipline or morale.
Id.
19. Id. See also note 13 supra and accompanying text.
20. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934, 941 (D.D.C. 1974). The
court noted:
The difficulty with the circular . . .is that it attempts to deal with the drug
abuse problem not only as a health problem, as Congress intended, but also as
a disciplinary problem.
Id. Recognizing the rehabilitative value of the inspections, the court allowed the searches
to continue provided that evidence obtained thereby was not used to support punitive
sanctions against participants in the program. Id. at 941-42. The court of appeals criticized this resolution of the case and noted that it "presents both practical and legal
problems. If the inspections are legal, any evidence of crime obtained therefrom may be
used in subsequent criminal action. [Citations omitted.]" Committee For GI Rights v.
Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 475 (D.D. Cir. 1975). Although the distinction made by the
district court is tenuous, it does produce a result consistent with congressional intent. The
legislative history of the enabling statute (Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, §
501(a), 85 Stat. 361) reveals that punitive measures were excluded in order "to provide
an atmosphere in which a drug abusing soldier can feel free to come forth and get medical
and psychological help to overcome his drug use." 117 CONG. REc. S8441 (daily ed. June
8, 1971) (remarks of Senator Hughes). To the extent that the Circular sanctions imposition of administrative and disciplinary sanctions, it undermines this purpose.
21. The court cited, inter alia, Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975);
Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974);
Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Committee For GI Rights v.
0
Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 22. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
23. Id., quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
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"[Tihe different character of the military community and of
the military mission . . . may render permissible within the
military that which would be constitutionally impermissible
outside of it." [Citation omitted.] We rely on that standard in
. . . holding Circular 600-85 constitutional.
The court indicated that the cumulative impact of several
factors required the conclusion that the procedures authorized by
the Circular were reasonable in the military context." It referred
to evidence that increased. levels of drug abuse have had a detrimental effect on military preparedness and efficiency and noted
that a soldier living on a military installation could not reasonably entertain the same expectation of privacy as his civilian counterpart. Reference was also made to the fact that the program was
primarily rehabilitative and only secondarily punitive. The court
emphasized that unannounced inspections are the most effective
method of identifying drug users and that military authorities
have attempted to safeguard the personal dignity and privacy of
those individuals subjected to inspections whenever possible.2
In Parkerv. Levy,2 the Supreme Court held that articles 133
and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justicer were not unconstitutionally vague. 28 The majority recognized the historic differences between military and civilian life, 29 but did not indicate to
what extent these differences justify the application of different
constitutional standards." The Callaway court relied heavily
upon Parker to support its conclusion that the searches authorized by the Circular are not unconstitutional.
The district court in Callaway characterized an inspection
under the Circular as3
a mass search [which] would be illegal in a civilian context if
conducted in the absence of particularized probable cause.
24. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
25. The Callaway court noted that Cir. 600-85, annex I, para. 3c requires that those
conducting the search must "[t]reat each individual and his possessions with dignity and
avoid undue harassment." Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 475 n.21
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
26. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
27. 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-34 (1975).
28. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752-57 (1974).
29, Id. at 743.
30, Id. at 758. The opinion acknowledged generalized needs for obedience and disci-

pline but did not discuss particular circumstances under which a different standard would
be appropriately applied. Id.
31. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934, 939 (D.D.C. 1974).
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[Citation omitted.] Moreover, the subsequent use for disciplinary purposes of facts developed during such a search or during
participation in a rehabilitative program ordered by reason of an
illegal search would be equally improper.

Certainly, the extent to which the court of appeals in Callaway
went in stressing its reliance on this "other standard"3 supports
the view that in the absence of such a standard the case would
have been decided differently.
The principle that differences between military and civilian
life permit distinctions in the adjudication of constitutional issues will not justify diminution of a soldier's rights in every case.
33
Rather, as several decisions in the District of Columbia Circuit
3
recognize :
"To strike the proper balance between legitimate military needs
and individual liberties [courts] must inquire whether 'conditions peculiar to military life' dictate affording different treatment to activity arising in a military context."

Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force35 is illustrative. The

Kauffman court held that the scope of collateral review of military judgments by civilian courts encompasses constitutional

considerations. The court rejected the contention that restrictions
on the review of military judgments were justified by the unique

character of military life.36 Limitations on review were found to
be without rational relation to the military circumstances which

may warrant qualification of constitutional requirements.37 Thus,
the rule that different constitutional standards apply to situations involving the military is qualified to the extent that further
32. See Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
33. See Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Kaufman v. Secretary
of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970).
34. Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1975), quoting Kauffman
v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 997 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013
(1970).
35. 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970).
36. Id. at 997.
37. Id.; see Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975) where the
court stated:
Because judges are ill-equipped to second guess command decisions made under
the difficult circumstances of maintaining morale and discipline ... we should
not upset such determinations unless the military's infringement upon first
amendment rights is manifestly unrelated to legitimate military interests.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Stolte v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392, 1402-03 (D.D.C. 1972).
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inquiry must be made to determine whether the alleged military
necessity is sufficiently compelling to warrant restriction of personal freedoms s and whether the proposed restriction is ration39
ally related to the military concern at issue.
Citing Schlesinger v. Councilman,0 the Callaway court declared that "[tihe increased incidence of drug abuse in the
Armed Forces poses a substantial threat to the readiness and
efficiency of our military forces." [Footnote omitted.]4 ' A careful
examination of the statistics submitted by the Army,42 however,
indicates that the 3,100 members of the USAREUR identified by
military law enforcement agencies as drug abusers in 197011 represent only 1.55 percent of the approximately 200,000 personnel
comprising the European Command. Of 1,374 randomly selected
personnel surveyed in 1973, only 2 percent admitted to the daily
use of drugs other than marijuana; only 10 percent admitted to
38. In a recent decision, Middendorf v. Henry, 44 U.S.L.W. 4401 (U.S. March 24,
1976), the Supreme Court has apparently added a further requirement. The Court held
that neither the sixth amendment nor the due process clause of the fifth amendment
requires that servicemen be represented by counsel in summary court-martial proceedings
under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1975). In
deciding the due process issue, the Court relied upon the conclusions of two judges of the
United States Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A.
298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973) (see notes 54-64 infra and accompanying text), and determined
that the denial of counsel is predicated upon a legitimate claim of military necessity.
Middendorf v. Henry, 44 U.S.L.W. 4401, 4407 (U.S. March 24, 1976). This determination
did not, however, mark the end of the Court's inquiry; the Court found it necessary to
consider "whether the factors militating in favor of counsel at summary courts-martial
are so extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress [footnote
omitted]." Id. Noting that the "presence of counsel will turn a brief, informal hearing
into an attenuated proceeding ....
Id., the Court concluded that the inconvenience and expense which would be engendered are not justified in light of the "relative
insignificance of the offenses being tried." Id. It is at least arguable that the interests
compromised by the regulations at issue in Callaway are of such magnitude that the test
set out by the Middendorf Court requires subordination of the military interest. See notes
71-73 infra and accompanying text.
39. Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
40. 420 U.S. 738 (1975) (holding that a soldier claiming that military tribunal did not
have jurisdiction to try charges pertaining to sale of drugs must exhaust military remedies),
41. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The
Callaway court neglected to indicate that the Supreme Court in Councilman did not
purport to make a finding of fact on the issue of the extent of drug abuse in the military;
the CouncilmanCourt's observations were made solely to support the conclusion that "the
expertise of the military courts is singularly relevant, and their judgments indispensable
to inform any eventual review . . . ." Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 760
(1975); see text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
42. See Brief for Appellants at 4-7.
43. Id. at 4.
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the regular use of marijuana." Similarly, mass urinalysis testing
conducted on a monthly basis during 1972 and 1973 revealed that
only 4 to 6 percent of those tested used amphetamines, barbituates, or opiates.4 5
The district court" found the statistics inadequate to justify
47
the measures under consideration and observed:
It is certainly clear that drug use in the Command has not
reached anything comparable to the epidemic proportions detected in Viet-nam and is not particularly different from drug
use encountered among civilians in major United States cities.
[Citation omitted.]

This conclusion is supported by the Staff of Senate Subcommittee on Alcohol and Narcotics, Report on Drug Abuse in the
Military8 which drew the following conclusion from its exhaustive investigations into the problem:49
We did not find that the use of drugs has a significant direct
impact upon the military mission of the Armed Services ...
[W]e saw no evidence that any mission or operation had been
jeopardized by drug use. Virtually every commander to whom
the Subcommittee staff put the question stated unequivocally
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id.
46. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934, 940 (D.D.C. 1974).
47. Id. Thus, the district court found that the first requirement of the general rule-a
showing of legitimate military necessity-was not satisfied. Judge Gesell explained:
Surveys of drug abuse since 1970 reveal a fairly stable level of daily drug use:
ten to fifteen per cent for cannabis and one to two and one-half per cent for other
drugs. There are no reliable statistics with respect to addiction, and the Army's
claim of increasing drug use is subject to serious question because of changes in
testing procedures.
Id. See also STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ALCOHOLISM AND NARCOTICS, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
REPORT ON DRUG ABUSE IN THE MILITARY, 117 CONG. REC. S8441, S8442 (daily ed. June 8,
1971) [hereinafter referred to as SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF REPORT]. This report would appear
to lend support to Judge Gesell's finding that the military's claim of necessity is unsupported by reliable evidence:
There is a paucity of hard data on which to base an authoritative finding of the
extent of drug use in the military. The few studies which exist have been made
exclusively among Army populations and are severely limited both in numbers
and in scope.

Id.
48. 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. S8441 (daily ed. June 8, 1971).
49. Id. at S8445. The Defense Department Comments on Report of the Subcommittee noted: "It is not considered a fair assumption that drug abuse among military personnel is more prevalent than among the civilian population." 117 CONG. REC. S8450-51 (daily
ed. June 9, 1971).
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and categorically that drug use has not adversely affected military effectiveness or the military mission of his unit.

While these facts might warrant enforcement of the most
stringent drug control program in a combat zone, they nevertheless fail to support the result reached in Callaway. The suit challenged the validity of searches of soldiers stationed in Europe.
Units assigned to the European Command are required only to
maintain combat-readiness-a duty discharged primarily by preparedness for routine administrative inspections.5 1 In light of the
actual military setting, the limitations on individual freedoms
which result from the implementation of the drug control program do not appear to bear a rational relation to "the military
circumstances which may qualify constitutional requirements."'"
An analysis of the drug abuse situation in West Germany
reveals a further deficiency in the approach taken by the Circular.
The Subcommittee found that the most widespread form of drug
abuse was the smoking of hashish, while heroin and cocaine use
appeared to be virtually nonexistent.5" It does not seem reasona50. SuBcoMrrraE STAFF REPORT, supra note 47, at S8443-44. Specifically, the Subcommittee found the following:
A jeep driver in Germany, for example, told us that his only consistent job
during the three months in advance of a unit-wide vehicle inspection was to
"maintain" his own vehicle. A platoon leader said the only time the morale of
his troops seemed to lift was when they were preparing to go on a tough training
exercise, which was infrequently. There was widespread griping about the many
"make work" jobs that troops were being given to do.
Id.
51. Kauffman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
52. In describing the drug abuse problem in the European Command, the Subcommittee Staff noted:
In Germany, there is a plentiful supply of hashish, amphetamines, and
barbituates, and U.S. troops and their dependents have easy and inexpensive
access to them. Hashish is by far the drug of choice, and is in widespread use
...."Uppers" and "Downers"-amphetamine preparations, Librium, Valium and Darvon-may be purchased inexpensively over the counter, without
prescription, in any German drug store.
... We had very little indication of heroin or cocaine use. Both the law
enforcement personnel and the medical personnel had had very little contact
with these drugs.
SUBCONIMrrrEE STAFF REPORT, supra note 47, at S8443.
53. Brief for Appellants at 5 n.4.
Similarly, in light of the Subcommittee's finding that there is little evidence of heroin
or cocaine abuse, it must be concluded that the preponderance of drug use within the four
to six percent group of "other drug" users would involve amphetamines and barbituates
which "may be purchased inexpensively over the counter, without prescription, in any
German drug store." Suacommrrraa STAFF REPORT, supra note 47, at $8443. Thus, perhaps
the most rational approach the Army might pursue in attempting to control the drug
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ble to establish a program which consists largely of urinalysis and
other clinical testing procedures which, as the Army admitted,
"do not detect use of cannabis products (hashish or marijuana)
"53

Rejecting the Army's claim that the complaint should have
been dismissed for failure to exhaust available administrative
remedies,54 the Callaway court noted that "[t]he issues involved
are purely legal, requiring no exercise of military discretion or
expertise." 55 This reasoning is questionable since the resolution of
a claim of military necessity must be sensitive to "conditions
peculiar to military life." 6 The result is significant in light of the
fact that military courts have been less willing than the Callaway
court to defer to the argument.
In United States v. Ruiz,5 7 the United States Court of Military Appeals considered issues raised by the implementation of
a drug rehabilitation program in Vietnam. This program was

strikingly similar to that considered in Callaway; both were theoretically directed toward treatment rather than punishment,"

but each provided for administrative discharges under less than
honorable conditions.59 In reversing the conviction of a soldier

who refused to submit to a mandatory urinalysis, the Ruiz court,
per Chief Judge Duncan, observed:

0

We recognize again the generally beneficent purpose behind
the Army's drug rehabilitation program. Even had the Governabuse problem would be to attempt to enlist the support of local authorities in an effort
to shut off the supply. Instead, the primary law enforcement emphasis has been on infil-

trating the "drug culture" through extensive use of undercover agents in order to arrest
large groups of users. Id. at $8446.
The irrationality of the USAREUR drug program's emphasis on barracks searches is
further highlighted by the Subcommittee's observation that the use of drugs and alcohol
"is more likely to occur on off-duty hours . . . . It is also likely to occur away from the
military post." Id. at S8443.
54. See note 5 supra.
55. 518 F.2d 466, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
56. Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1975), quoting Kauffman
v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Middendorf v. Henry,
44 U.S.L.W. 4401 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1976) (discussed in note 38 supra), the Supreme Court
observed: "Dealing with areas of law peculiar to the military branches, the Court of
Military Appeals' judgments are normally entitled to great deference." Id. at 4407. See
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975); note 41 supra.See also text accompanying notes 33-39 supra.
57. 23 U.S.C.M.A. 181, 48 C.M.R. 797 (1974).
58. Id. at 182, 48 C.M.R. at 798.
59. Id. at 183, 48 C.M.R. at 799.
60. Id. at 182, 48 C.M.R. at 798.
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ment relied on military necessity as justification for the program, it cannot be operated inconsistent [sic] with the
[privilege against self-incrimination embodied in Article 31(a)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice"1 ].
Ruiz represents a recognition by the highest military tribunal of
the superiority of individual rights over claims of military necessity.6" It is significant that a claim of military necessity would
have been far more convincing in Ruiz than in Callaway since
Ruiz involved a combat situation in Vietnam 3 where heroin addiction was a serious problem."
The Callaway court explained that although searches and
administrative inspections may not ordinarily be conducted without a warrant or the consent of the person being examined, the
absence of these safeguards does not render them unreasonable
per se. Reference was made to Camarav. Municipal Court 5 where
the Supreme Court noted:6"
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a
general exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the public interest justifies
the type of search in question, but whether the authority to
search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends
in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely
to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.
Relying on Camara, the Callaway court concluded that the administrative burden of obtaining warrants on a mass basis would
discourage military officials from conducting drug inspections. It
was also suggested that a warrant requirement might diminish
the effectiveness of the searches by affording advance warning to
the intended subjects.
61. 10 U.S.C. § 831(a) (1975). This section provides:
No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate
himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate
him.
62. The Callaway court distinguished Ruiz on the ground that it "was concerned only
with the accused's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination." Committee For GI
Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 475-76 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This distinction is questionable in light of the Supreme Court's observation that "[tihe values protected by the
Fourth Amendment ... substantially overlap those the Fifth Amendment helps to protect." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (dictum).
63. United States v. Ruiz, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 181, 48 C.M.R. 797 (1974). Compare with
text accompanying note 50 supra.
64. See note 1 supra.
65. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
66. Id. at 533.
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In Camara, the Supreme Court considered two issueswhether municipal building inspections may be conducted without a warrant, and whether warrants issued in the absence of
specific allegations of violations would be constitutionally sufficient.6 7 The Court held that warrantless inspections violated the
fourth amendment." In passing on the validity of administrative
area inspections in general, the Court found that the historical
acceptance of such inspections by courts and the public, the considerable public interest in preventing dangerous conditions from
arising, and the essentially nonpersonal and noncriminal character of such inspections militated convincingly in favor of a finding
of reasonableness.69 Since a valid public interest justified the relatively limited invasion of privacy which municipal inspections
involved, the Court concluded that there was probable cause to
issue a warrant without specific knowledge that a code violation
existed in a particular building."0
A comparison of the inspections considered in Camarawith
those conducted under the Circular reveals that the two are easily
distinguishable.7 ' There has been no prior judicial acceptance of
the type of mass searches conducted by the Army. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has consistently held that searches unaccompanied by warrants are permissible only in narrowly circumscribed situations.72 The Court has specifically noted that
warrantless searches involving intrusions into the human body
may never be justified absent an emergency which threatens the
73
destruction of evidence:

67. Id. at 534.
68. Id. at 528-34.
69. Id. at 537.
70. Id. at 538-39.
71. The district court found that the "health and welfare" inspections conducted by
the Army's European Command were not even analogous to traditional military preparedness inspections. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934, 939 (D.D.C.
1974). The court of appeals did not attempt to contest the validity of this finding. See
Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For examples
of traditional military inspections see United States v. Kazmierczak, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 594,
37 C.M.R. 214, 221 (1967); United States v. Lange, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 486, 35 C.M.R. 458
(1965) (administrative "shakedown" of a soldier's personal effects to determine readiness
not "unreasonable search and seizure").
72. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent of suspect); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (searches incident to lawful arrest); Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (plain view); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot
pursuit); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (exigent circumstances).
73. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (dictum).
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The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere
chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence
of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found,
these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer
the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an
immediate search.
While neither the search in Camara nor that in Callaway can
be said to have been primarily aimed at the discovery of criminal
evidence, punitive actions could have been taken in connection
with both.74 It is clear, however, that the penalties for municipal
code violations do not begin to approach the severity of those
which may be imposed by a military court-martial.
Perhaps the most serious difficulty raised by the Callaway
court's reliance on Camara concerns the issue of probable cause.
Camara stands for the proposition that where a particular type
of inspection is demanded by the public interest, the necessity for
a warrant depends partially on whether the purpose behind the
7 5
search would be defeated by the burden of obtaining a warrant.
Implicit in the concept that such a search is justified by the
public interest is the notion that probable cause to issue the
warrant exists by virtue of that interest.7 6 Thus, before the question of balancing the interest for searching against the burden of
obtaining a warrant is reached, the threshold requirement of
probable cause must be satisfied. Considering both the Senate
Subcommittee's findings that the most serious drug problem in
74. In reference to the municipal inspections, the Camara court stated:

Like most regulatory laws, fire, health, and housing codes are enforced by criminal processes. In some cities, discovery of a violation by the inspector leads to a

criminal complaint [footnote omitted]. Even in cities where discovery of a
violation produces only an administrative compliance order [footnote omittedi, refusal to comply is a criminal offense, and the fact of compliance is
verified by a second inspection, again without a warrant [footnote omittedi.
Finally, as this case demonstrates, refusal to permit an inspection is itself a

crime, punishable by fine or even by jail sentence.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 531 (1967). For a discussion of the punitive

aspects of the USAREUR drug control program see note 13 supra and accompanying text.
75. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).

76. Id. at 538-39. The Camara Court stated:
The warrant procedure is designed to guarauitee that a decision to search private
property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness

is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion
contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search
warrant. [Citation omitted.]

Id. at 539.
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West Germany involved the smoking of cannabis7 7 and a marked
shift in public attitudes toward such activities, a conclusion that
the probable cause requirement is supplied by the public interest
in preventing such activity, as in Camara, is clearly untenable.
One must, therefore, question the validity of the Callaway court's
conclusion that the probable cause requirements set forth in
Camarawere satisfied.
The Callaway court stated that a soldier's restricted "expectation of privacy" in the military was one of five factors to be
considered in assessing the reasonableness of the Army's drug
inspections."5 The court apparently concluded that a soldier's
expectation of privacy is substantial enough to trigger the application of the fourth amendment, but not substantial enough to
merit the protection usually afforded by the amendment.
Before the issue of fourth amendment reasonableness is
reached, inquiry must be made to determine whether the subject
of the search has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy
which society has deemed to be reasonable." If the circumstances
77. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
78. The changing public attitude toward the smoking of cannabis is evidenced by the
fact that an increasing number of state legislatures are enacting statutes decriminalizing
the possession of marijuana for personal use. See generally, Soler, Of Cannabis and the
Courts; A Critical Examination of Constitutional Challenges to Statutory Marijuana
Prohibitions, 6 CONN. L. REv. 601 (1974). As of October 1, 1973, 30 states had enacted
statutory provisions for conditional discharge for first offense possession of marijuana. Id.
at 616-20. Since 1973, six states have passed liberalized statutes under which the possessor
of small amounts of marijuana is no longer subject to arrest, prison sentence, or a permanent criminal record. National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, A Compilation of State Citation Laws for Minor Marijuana Offenses 1 (Aug. 15, 1975).
Three of the six states, Alaska, Maine, and Oregon, have eliminated criminal penalties entirely, substituting citation-enforced civil fines. See S. 350 (approved May 15, 1975,
effective Sept. 1, 1975), amending ALAsKA STAT. § 17.10.010 et. seq. (1972) (Reform of
Marijuana Laws, supra at 3) ($100 fine for possession of any amount in private or up to
one ounce in public); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, ch. 45 et. seq. (1975) ($200 fine for
possession of up to one and one-half ounces); ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.207(3) (1974) ($100
for possession of up to one ounce).
In California, Colorado, and Ohio, possession of specified small amounts of marijuana
is treated as a minor criminal offense, punishable by a fine with no permanent criminal
record attaching to the possessor. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 et. seq. (West
1975); and CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.6 (West Supp. 1975) ($100 fine for possession of up to
one ounce, misdemeanor, no permanent criminal record); H. 1027 (effective July 1, 1975),
amending COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-22-401 et. seq. (1974) (Reform of Marijuana Laws, supra
at 4) ($100 fine for possession of up to one ounce, class 2 petty offense, no criminal record);
H. 300, OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3719.01 et. seq. (1971) (reform of Marijuana Laws, supra
at 6) ($100 fine for possession of up to 100 grams or approximately 3/2 ounces, minor
misdemeanor, no criminal record).
79. Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
80. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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surrounding a search belie the view that the subject intended or
expected to preserve the privacy of his acts (as in "plain view"
cases'), or if societal values preclude honoring an expectation
actually held (as in cases involving prison searches),8 2 the absence
of the traditional indices of reasonableness-probable cause and
the issuance of a warrant-is of no constitutional significance. 3
The Callaway court's novel expectation of privacy analysis
provided an excuse to avoid the more probing evaluation envisioned by the Supreme Court when it first announced the test in
Katz v. United States."4 In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice
85
Harlan explained:
[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one society is prepared to recognize
as "reasonable."
Since Callaway was a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, it must be assumed that the court concluded that the second
prong of the test was not satisfied. In this respect, it is significant
that the act which authorized implementation of the Circular8
also established a ceiling on the number of persons who could be
drafted into the armed services.87 This limitation envisioned the
establishment of an all-volunteer army. 8 In a message to Congress, former President Nixon discussed the purposes underlying
the changes in the draft laws:"8
[W]ith an end to the draft we will demonstrate to the world the
responsiveness of our system of government-and we will also
demonstrate our continuing commitment to the principle of en81. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 916 (1973).
83. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding inter alia that exemplars
sought by a grand jury are not protected by the fourth amendment because the subject
had no expectation of privacy). In discussing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
the Dionisio Court noted that "the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for what
'a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office.... " United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (emphasis added), quoting Katz v. United States,
389 US. 347, 351 (1967).
84. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
85. Id. at 361.
86. Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, § 501(a), 85 Stat. 361.
87. Id. at § 101(9)(e), 85 Stat. 349.
88. Id. at § 101(29)(h), 85 Stat. 352.
89. 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1470, 1473 (1971).
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suring for the individual the greatest possible measure of freedom.
Although it might be argued that expectations of privacy
ought to be limited in a military setting, any consideration of the
issue should be sensitive to changing conditions in the military.
The analysis of the Callaway court is notably deficient in this
respect.
The Callaway court suggested two additional bases for its
findings of reasonableness. It stated that unannounced drug inspections are the most effective way of identifying drug abusers"
and that the Army has attempted to protect the privacy of soldiers who are subjected to inspection "insofar as practical."91 In
Camarav. Municipal Court,92 the Supreme Court rejected precisely the same arguments when advanced in support of the legality of a warrantless municipal code enforcement inspection. The
Court indicated that to dispense with the warrant requirement on
the strength of supposed protections contained in the enforcement scheme placed the individual at the mercy of the municipal
authorities. The Court also observed that "broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review . . . -13Significantly, the warrantless inspection which the Court found to
be unreasonable in Camarawas far less hostile and intrusive than
those involved in Callaway.
The Callaway decision marks an unprecedented approval of
wholesale infringements upon individual liberties traditionally
protected by the fourth amendment. The court's conclusion rests
solely on the fact that the searches occurred in a military context.
The Callaway court failed to recognize that those decisions which
speak of a "different constitutional standard" do not advocate a
blanket policy which absolutely shields military authorities from
constitutional scrutiny under any and all circumstances. Rather,
as a careful reading of the cases indicates, a showing of legitimate
military necessity must be made where limitations upon fundamental rights are involved. Similarly, it must be demonstrated
that the deprivation of rights necessarily attendant upon a program such as that implemented by the Army bears a reasonable
relationship to the military circumstances as they do, in fact,
exist.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Id.
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Id. at 533.
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In order to safeguard fundamental personal freedoms, American courts have traditionally stood between the individual citizen
and the exercise of governmental authority. When public discourse becomes enclosed within a circle of self-validating concepts like "military necessity," however, the fairness of methods
used to attain specific objectives becomes immaterial; offical action is legitimized by the overriding social goal. Addressing itself
to this point in United States v. Robel, 4 the Supreme Court
1

stated : 5

[Tihis concept of "national defense" cannot be deemed an end
in itself, justifying any exercise of . . . power designed to

promote such a goal. Implicit in the term "national defense" is
the notion of defending those values and ideals which set this
Nation apart. For almost two centuries, our country has taken
singular pride in the democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution. . . . It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national
defense, we would sanction the subversion of. . . those liberties

.. . which makes the defense of the nation worthwhile.
In Callaway, the District of Columbia Circuit has taken a disquieting step backward from the fulfillment of the historic function of the judiciary.
Mark M. Horowitz
94. 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (dicta).
95. Id. at 264.
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